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Voices from the Middle: How Performance
Funding Impacts Workforce Organizations,
Professionals and Customers
ROBERTA REHNER IVERSEN
University of Pennsylvania
Under recent policy reforms, the landscape of authority relations in welfare
and workforce development organizations has radically changed from one
that privileged internal professional autonomy to one that privileges exter-
nal authorities. Performance, rather than input funding is the medium for
this change. Longitudinal ethnographic research reveals that performance
requirements in workforce development both contribute to and challenge
organizational structure and program design, professional practices, and
job seeker outcomes. As such, when the "voices" of job-seeking customers,
directly and through their affiliated workforce organizations, professionals,
and employers, are added to the "voices" of funders under performance
funding, polyvocality may result in more consensual authority relations:
in particular, less autonomous power for professionals, less program hege-
monyforfunders, and greater power for job seekers over their futures. These
findings may also pertain to organizations and professionals funded under
other performance directives, such as managed care and welfare-to-work.
Key words: workforce development, performance funding, authority
relations, professionalism, ethnography
Background
Recent policy reforms have radically changed the landscape of
authority relations in workforce development and welfare organi-
zations from one that privileged internal professional autonomy
to one that privileges external stakeholders. Performance, rather
than input, funding is the medium for this change. Under the
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Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA), allocation of workforce
development funds is increasingly based on rates of placement
and retention' in the workplace (Danziger & Haveman, 2001;
Plastrik & Taylor, 2001). WIA mandates seventeen different per-
formance measures for the overall system (Buck, 2002). Simi-
larly, funding for welfare-to-work programs under Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is increasingly associated
with placement and retention outcomes (Iversen, 2000; Murphy,
Fishman & Barnow, 1999). Over this same period, the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 required federal agencies
to be accountable for outcome standards in what amounts to
performance-based budgeting (Williams, Webb & Phillips, 1996,
p. iii). Foundations, corporations, and other funders of non-profit
and proprietary organizations followed suit.
Before 1990, funding for most social service and workforce
development organizations was tied to the designs and processes
of their individual, generally independent programs. Such orga-
nizations were only held accountable for their "input," which
essentially meant their procedures or units of service delivery
(Frumkin, 2002). Under input funding, professional autonomy
was paramount. Professionals, in the form of management or
staff, defined and controlled client definition and recruitment.
Professionals determined program and client goals and objectives.
Professionals defined the scope and substance of the interven-
tions, measurement procedures, and target outcomes. Evaluation
generally consisted of an "audit function" (Williams, Webb &
Phillips, 1996): namely, tallying numbers of clients served and
asking professionals whether they did what they said they were
going to do. As Williams, Webb and Phillips (1996) note, the
public-sector preoccupation with procedures runs deep (p. v).
A similar preoccupation has held sway in private sector orga-
nizations (Letts, Ryan & Grossman, 1999). In essence, profes-
sionals have been the authoritative "voice" in workforce service
provision.
In contrast, under performance funding, administrative and
staff professionals are held accountable for customer outcomes.
Because workforce development organizations are increas-
ingly dependent on outside funding sources for their existence,
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professionals no longer have complete autonomy over their func-
tions. Public and philanthropic funding sources now define the
"customer," set performance targets and required outcomes,
specify measurement techniques to evaluate these targets and
outcomes, and have the authority to withhold funds until re-
quirements are met. In contrast to the past, when funding and
professional procedures occupied separate spheres, the funding
organization now may be the authoritative voice in structuring
professional workforce services.
In this paper, workforce development is viewed as "the poli-
cies, programs, and supports that can enable low-income people
to succeed in navigating an increasingly complex labor market
(Elliott, 2002, p. 1). Essentially, the goal of workforce development
is to redistribute jobs, earnings, work experience, and dignity
to the residents of low-income communities (Harrison & Weiss,
1998). Historically, workforce organizations offered education
and training, but little or no support for placement, retention,
and advancement in jobs (Danziger & Haveman, 2001; Gueron
& Pauly, 1991). In contrast, human service organizations tradi-
tionally delivered supports, but not education or training. Not
only were the professionals in each relatively autonomous, the
organizations functioned in silos as well. While this examination
focuses on workforce development, there may be significant par-
allels with social service organizations, especially those funded
under the guidelines of managed care or welfare-to-work poli-
cies. An early model outlining the interaction of multiple stake-
holders in human service organizations suggests such parallels
(Martin, 1980).
Ultimately, how workforce organizations respond to new per-
formance mandates has implications for their survival and for the
employment success of many low-income workers and family
heads. If flexibility and innovation-historic strengths of non-
profit organizations-are maximized under performance fund-
ing, workforce organizations may be able to increase capacity and
impact for job seeking customers (Grote, 2003). Conversely, if per-
formance funding strains management and staff beyond capacity,
organizations may reduce services or close and employment op-
portunities for low-income workers may be reduced. This paper
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explores how multiple stakeholders in workforce development
respond to performance funding mandates.
Framework and Argument
This exploration of workforce development and performance
funding is lodged in sociological concepts of authority and voice.
James Coleman (1990) defines authority as "the right to control
another's actions" (p. 66) and posits that when actions, rather
than goods, are the subject of exchange, an authority relation
may develop whereby one actor gives up rights to control his/her
actions to another (Coleman, 1990). While Coleman (1990) notes
that authority relations need not be conflictual or coercive, and
in their most benign form are oriented to mutual gain, I argue
that consensual authority relations offer the possibility of reduc-
ing power differentials that commonly exist under hierarchical
relations. In this paper, power is signified by "voice."
Issues of authority and voice are lodged more broadly here
in the context of professionalism. Despite the lack of a definitive
definition of "profession," professionals have characteristically
claimed the right to a high degree of autonomy, established and
sustained by privileged, if not monopolistic, practices and exclu-
sionary regulatory mechanisms (Larson, 1977; Macdonald, 1995).
The current climate of accountability gives funding sources new
power in the professional sphere. Just as managed care, in the
form of federal or state determination of service parameters, has
deeply changed the practice landscape for professionals in social
and health services, performance funding requirements, from
both public and philanthropic sources, now impact workforce
development professionals.
This paper explores two questions: First, whose voices are
heard in workforce development under performance funding
mandates? Those of the workforce organizations, represented
here through the voices of administrators and staff professionals?
Those of public or philanthropic funders, denoted here through
performance requirements? Or the voices in the middle, those of
economically disadvantaged2 job-seeking customers? Second, to
what end? How do new authority relations under performance
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funding impact workforce organizations, professionals, and job
seekers, from their perspectives?
The Context
Despite the economic boom in the 1990s, improvements in
workforce development were much needed. Results from evalu-
ations of workforce programs before TANF and WIA had been
equivocal about program effectiveness (Friedlander & Burtless,
1995; Mathur, 2002; Smith et al., 2002), increased numbers of
children of working parents remained poor (City Kids Count, 2001;
National Center for Children's Poverty, 2001), and employment
chances remained unequal for Blacks compared to whites and
Hispanics (Holzer & Offner, 2001; Moss & Tilly, 2001). In response,
the Annie E. Casey Foundation, a national philanthropic organi-
zation dedicated to child well-being, mounted an 8-year, multi-
city workforce demonstration program called the Jobs Initiative
with the goal of improving labor market opportunity for econom-
ically disadvantaged residents of impoverished inner cities across
America. The initiative's "social investor" approach (Giloth, 1995)
and results-focused funding design were the foundation's effort
to improve upon the limited impacts of the earlier programs,
based on the success of alternative models such as STRIVE (Harri-
son, 1995), Project QUEST (Osterman, 2001), Center for Employ-
ment Training (Harrison & Weiss, 1998; Mel~ndez, 1996); New
Hope (Bos et al., 1999; Huston et al., 2003), and selected others
across the country (Giloth & Phillips, 2000; U.S. Department of
Labor, 1994). At the same time, the tight labor market meant a
window of opportunity for women leaving welfare and other eco-
nomically disadvantaged unemployed or under-employed work-
ers, as many firms desperately needed skilled and semi-skilled
workers (Giloth, 1998). The demonstration program thus pro-
vides a platform for this exploration of authority and voice in
workforce development under performance funding.
In this context, required performance outcomes included ex-
panded organizational capacity, greater impact of professional
services, as demonstrated by increased rates of job placement and
retention, and "good jobs" for job seekers, defined as wages of
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$7 per hour or higher, in 1995 dollars, plus nonwage benefits and
advancement opportunity. We note, however, that the parameters
for "good jobs" were set in the mid- to late-1990s when the econ-
omy was thriving; in fact, the average wage of the nearly 6000 Jobs
Initiative placements in that period was $9.13 per hour (Fleischer,
2001). In the current environment of economic downturn, a more
difficult labor market faces job seekers and workforce organiza-
tions, as some of the voices in this paper reflect. As such, 'lessons
learned' from this exploration may be increasingly important to
organizations, job seekers and funders alike.
Structurally, a core "development intermediary" was located
or formed in five cities (Milwaukee, Philadelphia, New Orleans,
St. Louis, and Seattle) that contracted with or developed provider
organizations to craft community solutions to persistent inner-
city unemployment. These intermediaries included a nonprofit
investment vehicle comprised of labor, management, and re-
search; a new nonprofit civic organization; a regional investment
fund; a regional council of governments; and a municipal agency
(Hebert et al., 2002). The provider organizations were generally
either industry oriented or community-based nonprofit and for-
profit facilities. All offered job readiness training, skill training,
and support and retention services, in varying proportions and
degrees. In addition, the organizations were required to develop
new partnerships, often with employers, which was a missing
component in most earlier job training programs (Osterman,
1999). The foundation directed funds to the provider organiza-
tions through the intermediaries. Funds were linked to each in-
termediary's quarterly outcome targets for recruitment, training,
job placement and job retention, both overall and by provider
affiliate (Fleischer, 2001). Often, however, foundation funds were
only one source of income for provider organizations.
Under independent grants from the foundation, I directed
and led an ethnographic team that studied parents' work and
children's welfare in the context of these regional workforce or-
ganizations, professionals, job seekers and employers (Iversen,
2002). My team of nine researchers had regular contact with
twenty-five Jobs Initiative families in the five cities from January
2000 to June 2003 and with about 1000 auxiliary sources identified
as important to the families' work and home lives. Augmented
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by administrative and retrospective data, the data set covers up
to five years of information about families' advancement efforts
and the workforce organizations with which they were associated.
Ethnographic research methods were ideal for eliciting rich details
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) about how multiple stakeholders fared
in the context of new policies and programs. A 'dialogical' ap-
proach to research (Ostrander, 1995) involved regular and formal
feedback to and from all key informants through written and
verbal means throughout the research period. Triangulation of
researchers, respondents, and analysts afforded a wide-angle lens
on performance funding and increased the reliability of the data
and validity of the findings. A qualitative software program was
used for data management and code-based case construction from
the audiotaped and transcribed field material. Names of all per-
sons and organizations, with the exception of the foundation, have
been disguised to protect their identities. Moreover, the perspec-
tives expressed through each "voice" emerged repeatedly during
the analytic process, irrespective of the individual characteristics
of city, workforce organization, professional, job seeker or firm.
Findings
The "voices" of the Jobs Initiative stakeholders suggest that
performance funding both benefited and challenged workforce
organizations, professionals, and job seekers. The first section
addresses structural issues and program content in the workforce
organizations under performance funding, primarily from the
perspectives of intermediary and provider administrators and
staff professionals, amplified by the parallel experiences of their
job seeking customers. Employers' voices are also interspersed.
The second section addresses the roles and functions of the pro-
fessional service providers, whose voices are also amplified by
the perspectives of job seekers. Each section is roughly organized
according to "benefits" and "challenges," although overlap is also
illustrated.
How Performance Funding Benefited Organizations
Increased Data Capacity. Structurally, the philanthropic funder
required that all organizations establish management informa-
tion systems (MIS) in order to increase their capacity to collect
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and use data (Dewar, 2002; Gewirtz & Harrington, 2000). Both
providers and intermediaries reported that increased use of MIS
data contributed to more efficient staffing, whether 'up' or 'down:'
"We just hired a new person. What we know now about our grad-
uates is largely anecdotal. We're working on education (and other)
outcomes; our aim is to establish larger outcome domains." [Chief
Operating Officer, nonprofit community-based provider]
"I was not aware of the depth of the organization's problems when
I took this job.., especially the absence of matching funds. I inher-
ited a staff of 22; we are now 13. The ones that left could not produce
results." [Chief Executive Officer, development intermediary]
To a one, job seekers stressed that effective staffing was important
to their job outcomes, as the comments of this customer, a single
mother of two with a history of temporary jobs, exemplify:
"I really miss [Job Coach] from the healthcare training program. She
was really an inspiration to me, a young black women doing the 'do'
as we Ebonically say ... It's just that she has so much confidence,
she looks good, she sounds good, and she is so successful. And she
don't mind helping someone who wants to help themselves... At
times she would come pick me up and take me to work, and come
get me from work. All that helped so much... I needed to get my
confidence back.., to show I am one that is just going to keep at
it." [Loretta Lopez, customer of healthcare training provider]
New MIS capacity also enhanced the organizations' ability to
market their programs, as this exchange between an intermediary
CEO and his Board member typifies:
"The monthly report is a sign of how much clearer we are." [Chief
Executive Officer, development intermediary]
"The finance committee now has schedules we're comfortable get-
ting every month. This is a great relief. It makes our sales job so much
easier to have data." [Board Member, development intermediary]
In the best of circumstances, organizations used data and other
performance requirements to forward their mission of serving the
"hard to serve," as these intermediary and community executives
communicated to provider applicants at a proposal information
session:
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"We are looking to find a different way to pay for milestones and
recruitment without hurting the agencies. Our intent is not to jeop-
ardize your cash flow. The heavy emphasis on retention has been
hurting cash flow." [Director, development intermediary]
"We need to make sure agencies are not penalized by serving the
hard-to-serve." [Community consultant to the development inter-
mediary]
Increased Partnership Capacity. Structural changes in the form
of required new inter-organizational partnerships also increased
capacity. Because workforce organizations were responsible for
specific rates of placement and retention, they found that collab-
orating with employers and other workforce providers helped job
seekers get and keep jobs, as the comments of this administrator
and staff professional illustrate:
"Potential participants come to an orientation to hear about jobs and
training in manufacturing and assess the fit. We have employers,
unions, technical college and PIC [Private Industry Council] people
who do eligibility screening on the spot." [Director, manufacturing
training provider]
"I problem-solve with co-workers and supervisors at the provider
organization. I call employers too. In a recent example, we had a
conference between the employer, client, PIC, and me. In another,
I conferred with the employer, the client, and staff at the inter-
mediary. The employer wants the worker to stay. We worked to
problem-solve how this could occur. The group meetings facilitate
feedback and help the new worker stay employed." [Professional,
community-based provider]
Job seekers, such as former felon and parent of three, Kevin Mc-
Donalds, underscored that their training provider's partnerships
were critical to their employment outcomes:
"I was in a plumbing course before [training provider]. If there had
been more help job searching, like this program, it would have been a
nice program. I didn't know what I was looking for. I didn't have my
driver's license. I was a felon, and that was looked at not positively.
I was into the program, the classes, and figured they'd help find me
a job. I was thrown for a loop when they didn't. If people would
have cut the yellow tape-sent us to meet Bob, Joe, and Lou-it
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would have helped. Like this program did." [Kevin McDonalds,
job-seeking customer of printing training provider]
Employers also identified ways that new partnerships with work-
force organizations benefited them, as this manufacturing firm
manager outlined:
"What we were doing was we worked with a technical school in
the city here, we worked with the manufacturing training provider
there, and we started to get 'outside the box.' We had to find out what
was out there if we were going to succeed. We found that as we were
working with various educational and training agencies, we were
introduced into the state's work development program. I mean this
stuff all of a sudden was just snowballing and we said, 'My gosh,
wake up, you might as well take advantage of this stuff here'...
because we wanted workers." [Operations Manager, manufacturing
firm that hired graduates of a manufacturing training provider]
Program Improvement and Innovation. In the content arena, new
data collection and reporting systems informed organizations
about which workforce programs or program characteristics to
retain or drop (Dewar, 2002). One intermediary director described
funding-driven changes in a provider's business skills program
that were typical of many others' experiences:
"It's changed over time and greatly improved. There's room for a lot
more improvement. I've worked in many projects in many different
roles-I have to admit that one "plus" in the Jobs Initiative is there
have been changes made when changes need to happen. The orga-
nization is responsive to change-especially small changes. But it's
difficult to make monumental change. For example-the business
project is trying to structure more hard skills training into its reten-
tion activities, such as classes in web design. We know people want
more computer training." [Director, development intermediary]
Similarly, and more rapidly in the context of philanthropic
than public funding requirements, as provider organizations
evaluated unsatisfactory rates of retention and gained experi-
ence with the needs of their job-seeking customers, they added
content to their pre-employment programs to benefit job seeking
customers, as this program manager emphasized:
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"We tell participants about income disregard, EITC, TANF cut-off.
We do a lot of advising-one woman had 6 children and was using
up her lifetime eligibility. We gave her some hints about how to save
some of it." [Manager, healthcare training provider]
Although direct causality between program component and re-
tention cannot be ascertained, the twelve-month retention rate of
this healthcare provider was twice as high as that of healthcare
programs overall in the initiative (Hebert, St. George & Epstein,
2003).
Innovative program changes also took place in the context of
mandated new relationships between provider organizations and
employers, as this provider manager and participating employer
described:
"Company turnover is employers' concern. What to do to change
that? We instituted the role of workplace mentor together with
management and the union, for everyone [not just Jobs Initiative
workers]. When I first set up the programs in manufacturing, em-
ployers expected five to seven to turn up for mentor training-30 to
60 did! The company did a cost-benefit analysis and it saved $2000
in reduced turnover because of the mentor program. The key to
retention is building the environment in the facility, whether factory,
shop floor, or hotel. If you bring together varied individuals, you
get better system communication and recognition by incumbent
workers that you hope leads to more training, more education,
and better needs assessment." [Manager, manufacturing training
provider]
"[Have things changed at the plant as a result of the mentor pro-
gram?] I think people are more relaxed.. .The feedback that we are
getting is that it has been very beneficial to them [new workers]...
Early indicators are that it is working ... We have had feedback
from other companies, saying, 'How can we get involved in it?"'
[Operations Manager, manufacturing firm partner of a manufactur-
ing training provider]
How Performance Funding Challenged Organizations
Strained Staff Capacity. Workforce development organizations
commonly function on a financial "shoe-string," especially those
serving low-income customers, and thus rely on dedicated
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professional staff to work 'above and beyond' on behalf of cus-
tomers' goals (Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 1999). In this study, the
technical demands of the new management information sys-
tems and extensive data collection requirements, together with
the requirement to develop new partnerships with employers,
strained staff capacity and may have increased turnover, as this
staff professional described:
"The whole process is a juggling act... recruitment, funding, pro-
posals, monitoring, case management, retention... We've had a lot
of line workers leave in the past six to eight months. That impacts
the success of the program since our work is all about relationships.
If a worker is only there eight months, no relationship can build.
We've done two and one-half years of relationship building. Only
now are some of these meaningful relationships. The policy of
collaboration may be in place, but without the relationships, the
communication that greases the wheels of actual working together
falters." [Retention Counselor, printing training provider serving
Kevin McDonalds]
Staff turnover, in turn, daunted the confidence of new workers,
as this customer's sentiments typify:
"When I learned that Retention Counselor was gone, I was shocked!
She was the one that really got me motivated and started. She really
put me out there. I hated it when she left. Seeing her and talking
to her kept me motivated and uplifted." [Kevin McDonalds, job-
seeking customer of a printing training provider]
Had Kevin's retention counselor remained at the training pro-
vider, she might have been able to help him navigate a compli-
cated work-family situation that resulted in his dismissal from a
job he had successfully held for 18 months, as he reported:
"I'm not working at Bindery any longer. I don't like playing the
race card, but in reality, that's what it was. It was my fault also. I
missed the days. I had signed up for overtime months earlier, but
when I checked the schedule, I didn't see my name. I'd signed up
for every weekend for months in a row. I was there over a year and
some months and I never did a no-show. Others were given a second
chance. There was a guy there-he and I were 'into it.' His father
had worked there before him, and when he was a kid, he worked at
the company. I'd gone down south earlier to see my father; he was
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sick. They didn't want me to go-put me through an ordeal. When
I missed the overtime, that gave them the opportunity to get rid of
me." [Kevin McDonalds, job-seeking customer of printing training
provider]
Reduced Customer Service. Provider administrators also feared
that pressure to meet payment points and outcome goals would
lead to staff burnout and reduced customer service. For exam-
ple, four years into the demonstration, the technical capacity of
some community-based organizations remained limited, thus ex-
tra 'person power' was needed. Typically, only one staff member
could be spared for the task of reporting retention outcomes of
program completers. At the same time, increasing numbers of
completers needed to be tracked, followed-up, and sometimes
re-served. Others echoed this manager's report that overload led
to a reduction in essential customer retention services:
[Who does retention?] "I do. Every three months I try to contact
them personally. But this usually means phone calls where I often
just have to leave a message, or a follow-up letter. Some place-
ments come by to report in to me." [Manager, construction training
provider]
Job seekers also reflected this organizational challenge, as these
graduate's comments illustrate:
"They were supposed to have an after-care program to deal with
the graduates. I haven't heard from anyone there in 3 months. I told
them I was on a temp job. I didn't hear anything else from them.
The after-care program needs to be more intense. Really and truly.
I'd like them to... call us up and find out what's going on. Find
out any support we need-like childcare. Help us get what we need
from employers-especially financially." [Ayesha Muhammad, job
seeker graduate of community-based provider]
Applicant Selectivity or "Creaming." Other administrators pre-
dicted that strained organizational capacity would lead to ap-
plicant "creaming," whereby only those perceived likely to be
successful would be accepted into the program. In several in-
stances, the need to meet payment points reduced "potentials,"
who might have benefited from the workforce program's exten-
sive services, to "rejects," as this manager outlined:
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"I tell them [applicants] to come to the project at 7am and have
them volunteer here for several days-shovel snow, stuff envelopes,
etc. If they show up at 8:30, they're out. They have to demonstrate
dependability before I'll try to help them. This rules out about 80%."
[Manager, construction training provider]
Weak retention outcomes revealed by data collection and
reporting systems led to formal restructuring of the recruitment
base in other provider organizations. While higher rates of re-
tention resulted from such changes, the authoritative voice of
the funder via the intermediary-per design or interpretation-
eclipsed the provider's voice, as this manager's comments typified:
"Our placement focus used to be 30% directly into jobs and 70% into
skills training. Now with new funding directives it will be 70%/30%.
Much of the direct placement will be in dietary and housekeeping
jobs where there is on-the-job training. The tone now is moving away
from a "career" concept because we will place less emphasis on
CNA (Certified Nursing Assistant) training and more emphasis on
direct placement. The intermediary is concerned that CNA training
is not cost-effective; it's not meeting the healthcare network needs.
The emphasis on numbers compromises the training piece. But 90-
95% of the entire base is welfare recipients-you can't "direct place"
them. [Manager, healthcare training provider serving job seeker
Loretta Lopez]
Such data- and funder-driven decisions about customer recruit-
ment made leaner programs available to job seekers, but limited
organizations' ability to satisfy the performance requirement of
"good job" placements at the same time. Job seekers were diverted
into alternative and less lucrative employment paths that ran
counter to their career goals, as Loretta Lopez, 29-year old single
mother of two pre-school aged children, illustrated in response
to her provider's suggestion that she consider a dietary or house-
keeping position:
"Since I had my [medical assistance] certificate [from a previous
program]... I am focusing on getting a job in the medical field. I
want a job at a medical call center, if possible." [Loretta Lopez, job
seeker at healthcare training provider]
In order to attract matching funds, another performance require-
ment, and strengthen employers' desire for program graduates,
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provider administrators occasionally rationalized that selectiv-
ity, or "creaming," was necessary to sustain both program and
organization:
"Employers told us they were more interested in quality than quan-
tity." "We've done a lot of work to strengthen our assessment
process-hard-nosed testing for skills and career choice." [Director
and Retention Counselor, customer service training provider]
"What's central to our success is placing successful individuals in
jobs. Some of our success is due to the placements. I want to make
sure that they [employers] want more of my people. It opens up
more doors for others if they are successful. What makes it easy is to
send out a good worker." [Manager, construction training provider]
Most often, however, training providers absorbed the extra de-
mands imposed by reporting and retention expectations without
limiting customer access.
Unrealistic Definitions and Outcome Expectations. Finally, many
administrators believed that performance standards did not re-
flect the realities of job seekers' lives. As such, organizations tried
to use customer experience to "correct" critical definitions and
outcome expectations. This admistrator's opinion exemplified
the views of others, echoing Frumkin and Andre-Clark's (1999)
suggestion that nonprofits should define "success" in their own,
not solely business, terms:
"The system should be changed. It should be much longer term
because people come and go. Performance standards are different-
they assume a linear track. We should re-define 'success.' The perfor-
mance standards give 30 days to get a new job when an individual
loses a job-sometimes we can't even find the family for 60 days. If
they lose a job, it can easily take longer than 30 days to get another
job." [Director, community-based provider]
The need to redefine "success" was underscored by job seekers.
Former heroin addict and 31-year old single parent, Isabell Smith,
used a business training program to support and retain custody
of her children. Isabell initially defined success in the simple
terms of starting training-no small feat, as she was concurrently
transitioning out of a sheltered recovery facility, retrieving her
children from foster care, finding a therapeutic childcare program
140 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
for their residual developmental needs, locating an affordable
apartment, and enrolling in a job training program:
"L was my original case manager; she was so awesome. I was trying
to do everything and I was moving, getting my children back for
the first time, supposed to start school at the same time, and I called
her up freaking out. She was great and she told me, 'Girl, you are
nervous, but don't worry about it. School will still be there; you
can do the one in June."' [Isabell Smith, job-seeking customer of
community-based provider]
After this wisely-counseled delay, Isabell graduated from the
provider's affiliated business program and got a job at Dot-Com
Company at $10 per hour that she retained for 19 months until
the facility closed. By that time, she had been promoted twice and
earned $13 per hour.
Similarly, organizations felt that the definition of job seeking
"customer" was too narrow, as this director's comments illus-
trate:
"We're trying to educate WIA people and funders that our clientele
need as much support as if they were formally diagnosed with
'disabilities.' Ultimately, disability is not the disabling factor-it's
their psychological condition, their family, workplace policies and
practices, and their self-esteem." [Director, customer service train-
ing provider]
Indirectly, job seekers' experiences supported this need for redef-
inition. During their training or early employment months, fully
half of the 25 family heads scored above the mean for the general
population on the CES-D, a widely-used non-clinical depression
scale (Radloff & Locke, 1986), meaning "possible depression,"
while only one-third scored above the mean after several years in
the work world. Similarly, navigating dangerous work environ-
ments also showed that intervention needs persisted long after
training and twelve months of retention tracking, suggesting that
"customer" was a longer-term category than even the initiative's
liberal 12-month definition implied. Hard Working Blessed, a
former felon in his early 40s, suffered two herniated disks in his
back, two bouts of pneumonia, and repeated bouts of the flu in his
19-month crane operator position at Steel Mill & Foundry before
being demoted to "light duty" because of the injuries. He found a
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subsequent job within two weeks, but lacked information about
bridge health insurance to sustain his family's health during the
three-month probation period at the new job. His wife's com-
ments illustrated how defining the "customer" period as twelve
months was inadequate, especially for children's well-being:
"Well-child preventive visits, dental care, and children's eye test-
ing [with implications for school performance] were all postponed
during this period." [Mrs. Hard Working Blessed, wife of manufac-
turing training provider customer]
Other voices identified the need to redefine "retention," as this
administrator's comments suggest:
"Performance-based compensation is really a problem. There are so
many complex situations. It comes down to quality treatment versus
numbers processing. One of our biggest problems right now is white
men. They don't stay at it. We put a lot of energy into them-but
they don't stay. A second problem is African American men. But
the problems are different. The African American men don't think
they can do the job; their self-esteem is low. The white men don't
think they need any help. Some of them have criminal histories and
lots have substance abuse problems." [Director, community-based
provider]
In response, one intermediary digressed from performance fund-
ing directives and then advocated with the funder for new pro-
cedures:
"We have sent out a Request for Proposals to community organiza-
tions for case management services that are not performance-based.
The focus will be, 'This is a client; these are the issues.' Ongoing as-
sessment is really necessary. Performance-based funding constrains
the time [and] the quality of assessment procedures. [We] can't meet
payment points because you need lots of time to do good individual
assessments. The foundation thought that if we give them a job, it's
a solution. I see that we give them a job, it's more problems. We
need to renegotiate the complexity." [Director of retention services,
development intermediary]
In fact, because a compelling case for this change was buttressed
by data on job seeker characteristics and "stories" about housing,
transportation, childcare, and children's school problems, the
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intermediary was able to expand its retention services and retain
funding.
As a whole, provider organizations also argued for defin-
ing a broader range of "outcomes" than specified under perfor-
mance funding. This intermediary manager's statement typified
the broader critique of the TANF and WIA policy emphasis on
work over education and training (Connolly & Gottschalk, 2000;
Benner et al., 2001):
"Teresa's class learned... She was placed before the last week
of training. By graduation, she had a job. [Rental Car Company]
hired her. There were two others who were skilled besides Teresa.
One stayed in college to continue his education; he's in his 60s.
He's considered a 'failure' under performance funding. Further
education [only] counts as long as a person is working." [Manager,
development intermediary]
Similar sentiments about how to define "outcome" were ex-
pressed by an intermediary director in reference to the paucity
of public funding under the welfare and workforce reforms:
"Maybe folks are learning that 'there's no quick fix.' All the family
issues are interrelated. Retention support is the hardest money to
raise. There's money for training; money for placement. But not for
retention, yet it takes forty cents of every dollar. The big issues are
childcare [because] it disappears too quickly after the worker's wage
level rises just a little; turning the clock off during education; and
support for retention. I hope that reauthorization leads to more con-
ceptualization of welfare-to-work as poverty reduction. That means
longer-term investment." [Director, development intermediary]
Mission Strain. In a similar vein, administrators and profession-
als in provider organizations often felt that performance fund-
ing strained their mission to serve economically-disadvantaged
customers-a common perception among nonprofits (Blazek,
1996) that at times masks ineptitude, but at other times results
in advocacy for job seeking customers. This manager's views
reflected those of many provider administrators:
"As we move into retention now in the intermediary, it's not where
it should be. It's a problem of the inadequacies at the front-end
determining the results at the back end. It's a kind of cumulative
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domino effect. The numbers are low now in the business project;
recruitment is low, the infrastructure is bad, and the program is
numbers-driven. They forget the true mission and purpose of the
program. Performance-based funding is a problem. The intermedi-
ary said they are doing more front-end funding now, but the skill
and competence of the community organizations isn't enough. Any
time there are behavioral change issues it takes a lot of preparation.
The pattern is now: 'get the client in-worry later' versus 'get the
preparation done on the front end, which will take care of the later."'
[Manager, development intermediary]
Multiple Funding Sources. A final organizational challenge re-
sulted from the fact that the provider organizations all received
funding from multiple sources, each with idiosyncratic eligibility
and outcome requirements that thwarted the provider's mission
and capacity to serve low-income job seekers. Such conflicts oc-
curred regardless of funding source, as administrators reported:
"We compete with TANF agencies, and they control participation.
They can choose not to send to a JTPA program [like we used to
be]." [Manager, printing training provider]
"[City Workforce Organization (CWO)I is one of our funders. We
assess the potential trainees and then we lose them there. They are
not designated eligible for our program. We lose at least half this
way. They don't pass assessments at CWO. [Why?] They have to
show city residence and proof of such. Many don't have proof and
others don't live in the city. They have to show two forms of ID.
Many don't have two forms. They have to demonstrate 5th grade
math and 6th grade reading. We've already given them a rigorous
assessment-even after they've passed our assessment, they don't
pass CWO's. We expected them to come to us from CWO already
certified-it would be our feeder program. It hasn't worked out that
way. Our assessment is at least 1 1 hours. We do some behavior
testing. They've sent hundreds to be assessed. And then we lose
half of them." [Director, business training provider]
The challenge of multiple authorities directly impacted job seek-
ing customers and their employment futures, as illustrated by
Ayesha Muhammad, a mother of five in her early 40s who was
forced to change careers because a life-threatening injury ended
her certified nursing assistant career. Ayesha Muhammad's
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experience also illustrates that changes in program content took
time to develop, often because the requirements of public and
philanthropic funders conflicted with each other:
"To be honest with you, I was not skilled. The skills that I picked up
are from the learning centers that my job had. I learned about Excel. I
learned Microsoft. I learned just about everything I had to do to deal
with computers [on my job]. I know how to print out spreadsheets.
I know how to do logs. They [provider program] didn't teach you
that." [Ayesha Muhammad, job seeking customer of a community-
based provider]
A skill instructor at the provider organization echoed Ayesha's
assessment that the computer training was not sufficient for office
jobs. He noted that even one year after Ayesha attended the
program, TANF funding requirements prevented using philan-
thropic funds to offer more intensive skill content:
"The early computer training was too basic. We spent a lot of time
on soft skils. They might only have learned how to save a file on a
desktop; delete a file; and edit a document." [Can students switch
to a more advanced computer course?] No. Students are referred to
[provider] if they have work experience and some skills. They get 4
weeks class training, but some are changing careers [like Ayeshal.
You can't pick up skills in 4 weeks... poorer students often don't
even reach basic skill levels in 6 months." [Computer Instructor,
Ayesha's community-based provider]
Ayesha Muhammad's work supervisor described the career-
restraining effects of TANF funding regulations under which past
work experience, rather than future career needs, determined the
length of skill training:
"She didn't have any computer experience when she started work-
ing here... She has taken advantage of attending some of the
classes we had during company time ... We selected Ayesha to
move to a position from sending bills to receiving... it will be a
lateral move for her." [Supervisor of Ayesha Muhammad at Financial
Insurance Company]
In a small change, however, two years after Ayesha participated,
the provider's computer training was expanded from 11 to 15
hours per week, largely in response to pressure from the pro-
vider's employer partners, job seekers and professional staff.
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How Performance Funding Benefited Professionals
Professionals in service and workforce organizations are
particularly vulnerable to being caught between the demands
of performance funding and their view of professional service
(Frumkin, 2002). Even so, workforce professionals in this study
acknowledged benefits as well as challenges under performance
funding.
Customer-Oriented Service Changes. In the best of circumstances,
self-assessment procedures required under performance funding
revealed problems at both professional and program levels that
led to favorable service changes, as these job seeker and profes-
sional perspectives exemplify:
"We did career assessment when Lucky Miracle [Asian immigrant
job seeker] first came. When he came, the program was just starting.
Sometimes there was not enough time to go into his history-how he
got here. When you get a chance, you try to. So many meetings and
clients. I have welfare-to-work, Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation.
I try to take care of a lot; I'm running around like crazy. I have a
common understanding with Lucky. He is a high functioning client.
Sometimes I end up focusing on those who are more in trouble."
[Case Manager, community-based provider serving Lucky Miracle]
Lucky offered a different perspective from that of his case man-
ager about the services he needed:
"He contacts me every two to three weeks. He's trying to find me
a job. Before the program I saw him every few weeks. Now he just
calls. He's very, very busy." [Lucky Miracle, job seeker served by
the community-based provider's case manager]
When the professional learned that, in fact, Lucky's job search
was floundering, he re-assessed his role:
"I rely on what clients tell me. I guess I need to question them. Take
what they say and work with them." [Case Manager, community-
based provider]
The customer's "voice" was heard such that the professional
urged his organization to negotiate with the funding source for
a smaller caseload. The negotiation was successful and the pro-
fessional reached out more intensively to Lucky, and others like
him, as a result.
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Increased Customer Advocacy. Performance funding also enhanced
professionals' customer advocacy role. As professionals collected
"stories" from job seeking customers, and learned more about
their backgrounds through expanded MIS data capacity, they col-
lected a body of evidence that increased their ability to advocate
for them after they entered the workplace. Advocacy is, of course,
a traditional role of nonprofit professionals (Frumkin, 2002); in
this study it was practiced by for-profit provider professionals as
well:
"We talk about anger management, racism, drug problems, attitude
problems, value differences, choices. In the retention phase, we look
at workplace situations: Do you need an advocate? You have rights.
We try to empower them; give them confidence. I write a letter
introducing myself and the retention services to the individual's
employer, unless the customer asks me not to. I tell the employer
about the Jobs Initiative 'support program' and ask them to bring
any questions or issues to me." [Professional, for-profit community-
based provider]
When partnered teen father of two, Ahree Raca, encountered
racism in a new construction apprentice position, his mentor
at the development intermediary advocated directly with his
employer and guided Ahree through the formal union com-
plaint process. Ahree had recorded these among other racial
incidents:
"The supervisor called me names, like 'Dummy, homie, home slice,
and Muslim.'The supervisor also said to me, 'My daddy had slaves,
now I have me one.' The supervisor put his hands on me and smiled.
When I asked him to stop, he said, 'Get out and head for the house.
Go to the union if you want.'The supervisor asked me, 'What do you
bleed, because it can't be red?"' [Ahree Raca, construction training
program graduate]
Because of his mentor's direct advocacy and guidance, Ahree
reported that a meeting between his boss, his supervisor, and
himself resulted in immediate relief from the harassment and his
decision to remain on the job:
"He didn't give the supervisor a chance to deny my allegations,
because there had been past allegations by others against the super-
visor. My boss told the supervisor, 'Times have changed,' and that
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his behavior was not acceptable and would not be tolerated ... It
made it hard to go to the job,. . . [but] we worked together afterward
without any more incidents of harassment." [Ahree Raca, construc-
tion training program graduate]
Increased Self-Advocacy. Workforce professionals also perceived
that they could turn the performance requirement of organiza-
tional self-evaluation to their benefit. The director of a develop-
ment intermediary allocated a larger proportion of funding to
professional salaries in response to an analysis such as the one
this professional reported:
"The sector managers make $52,000 to $62,000 depending on ex-
perience. Three times what we're making. They're the guys sitting
there pontificating and theorizing and making policy. [The sector
managers and I]-we're really a team. It takes a team effort to help
people. In the new request for proposals between our organization
and the intermediary, we're looking at case manager salary." [Pro-
fessional, community-based provider]
On the other hand, such advocacy did not always result in success,
as this manager noted, drawing his conclusions from previous
employment as a training provider case manager:
"At [training provider] my boss never let me see a contract. Directors
don't want to let case managers know how much the intermediary
is paying them-this would give case managers leverage to ask
for raises. Thus, there's a lot of turnover." [Manager, development
intermediary]
How Performance Funding Challenged Professionals
Role Strain/Challenge to Professional Expertise. Professionals that
work in organizations have historically experienced tension be-
tween allegiance to the tenets of their profession and competing
demands from the organization (Frumkin, 2002). In this study,
role strain was the most pervasive challenge that professionals
experienced under performance funding, exhibited most often in
concerns about reduced quality of professional service. Reporting
requirements conflicted with professionals' convictions of how
to best meet customers' needs, as this case manager's comments
illustrate:
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"I guess at [development intermediary] retention means from the
first day in a job to one year. But what about the person who has
a job for one month, loses the job, and is unemployed for the next
six months? If the person works for one year after the second job,
what kind of retention does he or she get? I guess if I consider the
retention year according to the second job-my work load would
be too heavy. And then there are the accountability figures for
the intermediary-it's pretty confusing." [Professional, community-
based provider serving Maya Vanderhand]
This professional, as others, rued that lack of time for in-person
contact limited the level of relationship-building and individu-
alized attention that she considered hallmarks of professional
expertise. In this case, her job-seeking customer concurred and
spoke for others by critiquing such impersonal professional pro-
cedures in terms of the results she sought:
"I look at it like what do you call those people-like social workers-
they go out to the families and look at how the kids are doing and
stuff like that. If you have a case manager and that case manager
has, I don't know how many [clients], they might have so many of
them that they can't really focus. I was transferred from X to Y to Z.
Z has been helping me with a lot of issues-gas vouchers, the move
to this apartment, shoe vouchers. Now that I've been on my job for
a year, Z is transferring me to somebody else. I feel so bad. I didn't
really know Z, and now I'm being transferred. The contact should
have been person to person." [Maya Vanderhand, job seeker served
by community-based provider]
Maya's case manager agreed with this critique and not only ex-
tended oversight of vulnerable customers, such as Maya, past the
one-year mark of designated service, but facilitated changes in
the organization's service practices in line with Maya's recom-
mendation:
"I called Linda personally to let her know about Maya [the cus-
tomer], and set up an in-person meeting for them to meet each
other." [Professional, community-based provider serving Maya
Vanderhand]
At the same time, the case manager was increasingly stretched
beyond her service limits, which threatened to derail the change
she implemented before the new procedure became firmly estab-
lished:
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"I have 68 clients now. My maximum was 75." [Professional, com-
munity-based provider serving Maya Vanderhand]
Reduced Autonomy. Reduced autonomy was a second but preva-
lent constraint that professionals experienced under performance
funding. Autonomous professional authority was essentially re-
placed by shared authority between professionals and customers
and between multiple professionals. This retention counselor was
one of many that valued autonomous one-to-one service over the
performance requirement of service by multiple providers:
"The people we work with really need relationships. They bond
with someone. When they connect, they're yours. They stay." [Re-
tention Counselor, community-based provider]
Many job seekers similarly valued sustained, autonomous re-
lationships, associating them with improved employment out-
comes:
"He [case manager] became kind of a friend. I can call him at
home... He gives encouragement to me. The automotive course
was... postponed two times; I was two months waiting. Case
Manager steadily encouraged me. 'It's gonna happen.' He helped
with gas vouchers. He told me that he has the font picked out for
my shingle when I open my own repair business." [Teresa Russell,
job-seeking customer of community-based provider]
Teresa's case manager underscored that this relationship, over
time, was vital to Teresa's job retention:
"Teresa, for example, calls me at home now and then if she's had a
bad day at work. She'll show up for work if she gets to speak her
mind." [Case Manager, community-based provider serving Teresa
Russell]
At the same time, Teresa's career benefited financially and edu-
cationally from multiple professional resources:
"I go over to school [skills training partner of Teresa's community-
based provider] to work on my truck and I had my [former] instruc-
tor help me with whatever I needed... As long as I can do the work
on it, I can take it over to the school and if [former instructor] has
a day open, he is more than willing to let me bring it in and work
on it, which is really a plus because it was going to cost me $150 for
a mechanic to do the work." [Teresa Russell, job-seeking customer
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of community-based provider and its automotive training provider
partner]
Because professionals' partnerships with employers were
weakened after the economic downturn in spring 2001, their
autonomy was even further challenged, as this program director
outlined:
"We have an Employer Advisory Council. Big name employers are
on this council to see us succeed. Right now, none of these employers
are hiring. There are 100 of them. None are hiring. [Why?] The
economy. The downturn has hit them hard. And it's about to get
worse. Two airline companies were on the Council. At our initial
Council meeting, employers mobbed me afterward saying 'when
can we hire your graduates?' One company wanted 40 of them.
Now, especially after the terrorist activity and fallout for the airline
industry, the market could be flooded with 5000 customer service
people with experience. We're banging on their doors with a gift-
six weeks of customer service training. New employers write us
off as a 'temporary agency' or welfare program, which we are
not. They've been burned before by welfare-to-work programs."
[Director, customer service training provider]
Work Overload. Professionals also found themselves over-
worked and overburdened in workforce organizations that did
not have sufficient funding to "staff up" to meet the performance
demands, as these comments typified:
"Work day? On paper, 8-5. Actual, maybe 6:30 a.m. to coincide with
first shift, or to 7 p.m. and after, to coincide with later shift. I make
a lot of phone calls from home. Probably more like 60 to 70 hours
per week." [Job coach, healthcare training provider]
"I have a 'caseload' of about 300-just impossible to fully track. The
manufacturing program has at least 500 graduates. The program
likes to stay in touch-there are a lot of Hard Working Blesseds
[job seeking customer] out there, but it's absolutely impossible.
Technically, Hard Working Blessed is beyond required program
tracking-the intermediary does not technically track after I year-
formally. Informally, all sectors do follow-up." [Retention specialist,
manufacturing training provider serving Hard Working Blessed]
Hard Working Blessed might have benefited from consultation
about the physical dangers on his job noted earlier, but he hesi-
tated to burden his retention specialist, as many customers did:
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"I guess I figure that part with me is over. They helped me along
in the time of need [getting a job] and now they have to go off and
help someone else in their time of need." [Hard Working Blessed,
job-seeking customer of manufacturing training provider]
Professionals feared that such overload contributed to lower
rates of retention among program completers because their post-
employment needs went unmet. Accordingly, drawing on the
voices of their professional staff and job-seeking customers, pro-
vider organizations pressured funders to allocate more money for
staff expansion. In some cases, such funding was allocated, as this
workforce professional's response to the interviewer's question
about caseload suggests:
"Caseload? [chuckle] I have 60 to 70 people per contract and we usu-
ally have two contracts at the same time. The CEO of [our provider]
organization is reviewing caseloads right now. There are going to be
some changes!" [Retention Counselor, community-based provider]
Discussion and Implications
This paper used ethnographic research conducted in the An-
nie E. Casey Foundation's Jobs Initiative as a platform to explore
performance funding in workforce development, finding that
new authority relations were evident among organizations, pro-
fessionals, job seekers, and public and philanthropic funders, for
good and ill. Workforce administrators and professionals voiced
organizational improvements that job seekers and employers
underscored, such as in-person transfers to new support profes-
sionals; more intensive and individualized outreach services for
retention; increased capacity for and use of data; and substantive
changes in training content. Moreover, the immediacy of the re-
quirements under performance funding meant that many of these
changes were made over a relatively short period of time, thus
countering the "change inertia" often present in busy workforce
or human service organizations.
Performance funding also led workforce professionals, job-
seeking customers, and employers to collaborate on strategies to
retain and eventually advance new workers, improving chances
of economic mobility through employment. If retention outcomes
had not been a funding requirement, community-based organiza-
tions and training providers could easily have been side-tracked
152 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
by the depth and extent of the post-training and post-employment
problems that customers experienced, devolving to time-worn
professional practices and program procedures in response. In-
stead, the development intermediaries, provider administrators
and professionals, employers, and job seekers often coalesced
around program and service improvements, monitored them,
and made mid-course corrections when necessary. Most of the
time, they saw that the self- and external assessments that were
mandated by performance funding resulted in higher rates of job
retention and better employment outcomes for customers.
At the same time, the performance funding picture was not
completely rosy. The ability of both organizations and profes-
sionals to satisfy their mission, remain true to their professional
tenets, and remain relatively autonomous as service providers
was limited by the external authority of funders. Professional
staff, in particular, chafed under the new authorities, believing
that job-seeking customers were more often hurt than helped
by the service changes that resulted from performance require-
ments. Very occasionally, funds were withheld temporarily until
provider goals were met, but this was seen as less problematic
than the other performance requirements. Perhaps most worri-
some, the temptation of some providers and professionals to
select applicants who were "most likely to succeed," in order to
meet performance demands and keep organizations intact, was
antithetical to ethical professional practice, to the overall aims of
funders, and to successful employment outcomes for job seekers.
While it appeared that job seekers, as a whole, were more helped
than challenged by the changes that accrued in workforce orga-
nizations and professional services under performance funding,
workforce development stakeholders must remain vigilant about
customer selection criteria and procedures if the redistributive
goals of philanthropy and public policy are to be realized.
In sum, the experiences reflected in this paper suggest that
neither professional nor funder should be the sole authority in
workforce development. Workforce program design, professional
practices, and customer outcomes may be improved if the "voices"
of job seekers, directly and through their affiliated administra-
tors, professionals, and employers, are added to the "voices"
of funders under performance funding. Multiple voices may
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assure more consensual authority relations: in particular, less
autonomous, unaccounted-for power for professionals; less pro-
gram hegemony for funders; and greater power for job seekers
over their futures.
Clearly, characteristics other than performance funding in-
fluence workforce development outcomes, such as the state of
the labor market, "fit" between job seeker and firm, job seeker
background, and the like. But ultimately, performance funding
may be an important component to help job seeking customers
achieve better employment results rather than simply experi-
ence better "procedures" that may not be connected with re-
sults. Employer customers may benefit similarly. Experiences in
this demonstration program under performance funding can be
used to encourage consensuality and polyvocality in the design
and implementation of workforce development efforts, and to
identify, proactively, areas of expectable conflict and challenge.
These experiences may also offer valuable "lessons learned" to
organizations and professionals funded under other performance
directives, such as managed care or welfare-to-work.
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Notes
1. "Job retention" is not yet universally defined. The original WIA legislation
required states to report retention and earnings 12 months after entry into
employment (Public Law 105-220, August 7, 1998). The TANF program has
allocated funds for employment retention, but has not defined retention (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 2003). In this paper and in the
Jobs Initiative (Giloth & Gewirtz, 1999; Fleischer, 2001; Welch, 2001), job reten-
tion is defined as labor market attachment for 12 months with no more than
30 successive days of unemployment. Retention does not necessarily signify
remaining in a single job, but wages must be stable or improved in job change.
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2. "Economically disadvantaged" in this paper and in the Jobs Initiative is
defined as family income below 200% federal poverty level.
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